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ABSTRACT
The phenomenal growth of the Islamic banking and finance (IBF) industry
has been remarkable since it came into existence just over thirty years ago.
However, a closer reading of this positive development indicates that the IBF
industry does not necessarily share the aspirations of Islamic economics,
which aims at creating a world order in which the moral economy of Islam with
its authentic value system can exist.  In other words, the Islamic economic
system aspires for the development of Islamic economics and financial
institutions founded upon homoislamicus, agents concerned about social
justice and human-centred economic growth and development. This indeed
indicates the divergence between the aspiration of Islamic economics and the
world of IBF.  After highlighting and analysing the tension areas between the
two and the reasons and sources of this apparent divergence, this paper
argues that IBF needs to move into its third stage of development through the
institutionalisation of social banking as a second best solution in overcoming
the social failure of IBF and in creating value-added for capacity building and
social justice.
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1.INTRODUCTION
The recent unprecedented growth in Islamic banking and finance (IBF)
vindicates the aspirations of both the founding fathers of Islamic
economics and Muslims all over the world. However, a critical analysis
of IBF institutions’ phenomenal growth indicates a contradictory
development. Namely, that Islamic finance, currently, does not seem to
share the foundational claims of Islamic economics. While developments
in the discourse of Islamic economics have been weak due to
underdeveloped intellectual capital and lack of research interest, the
emerging wealth in the Muslim world, particularly in the Gulf region
forced IBF to develop beyond the framework of Islamic economics,
which resulted in weaker developments in its practical discourse.
To be more precise, Islamic economic theory has developed
coherent foundational axioms without the operational axioms through
which IBF institutions can function.  In response, IBF has implicitly
adopted neo-classical assumptions. In other words, IBF, with a
pragmatist attitude, adheres to the precepts of a neo-classical paradigm
of managing wealth that conflicts with the foundational axioms upon
which an Islamo-ethical financial system was intended to be built.
Granted, certain tendencies of neo-classical economics are found in
the pioneering writings of Islamic economics, however, these are mostly
related to policy suggestions rather than axioms or methodology. This
contradictory tendency in contemporary IBF can be observed in its
eclectic methodological framework, which, due to its neo-classical nature,
ignores the intrinsic social-welfare emphasis in Islamic economics that
emphasizes both individual self-maximisation and maximisation of
societal well being.
Hence, IBF does not support nor is it supported by the normative
assumptions of Islamic economics. Consequently, the pragmatic
approach adopted by IBF plays an important  role in the
internationalisation of capitalism throughout the Muslim world.  In the
Western world, the emergence of social responsibility, ethical finance
and business practices has constrained extremes of capitalist hegemony.
However, in the Muslim world, capitalism, in its most primitive and
inconsiderate form is thriving, despite the fact that Islamic economics
provides foundational axioms that proposes an ethical system of
economics and finance based on the ontological and epistemological
sources of Islam.
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Without premising Islamic finance on the normative value-principles
of Islamic economics, IBF is reduced to the mere removal of ribŒ
(interest) and conducting financial activity in contractual norms derived
from the shar¥cah. Rather than being part of the Islamic political
economy, IBF has been pursuing policies away from the theoretical
underpinnings and systemic understanding of Islamic economics and
has located a surrogate financial framework in neo-classical economics.
This trend has troubled the founding fathers of modern Islamic
economics. Thus, “a distinctive feature of the recent discussions on
Islamic banking has been the growing wedge between its conventional
theory and current practice” (Hasan, 2005).
This paper, thus, aims to highlight the tension areas between Islamic
economics and IBF, by particularly making reference to its participants,
namely, homoislamicus and homoeconomicus through normative
assumptions.  More clearly, it will focus on each participant’s institutions,
constructs of their respective political economies in regards to their
normative principles and the outcomes of both paradigms.  Therefore,
to accomplish this objective, this paper pursues discourse analysis as a
methodology, through which it aims to highlight how each of these two
paradigms are being constructed.  In other words, a political economy
approach, with a methodology utilizing discourse analysis, is adopted to
locate the manner in which Islamic economics and IBF have developed
separate from each other in terms of divergent trends and paradigms.
Consequently, the failure in developing an ethical financial system and,
hence, developing ethical norms away from legal interpretations of the
shar¥cah is to be discussed.
This paper suggests that Islamic economics has a great potential to
create an ethical Islamic financial system that is not only relegated to
the elimination of ribŒ or interest.  However, this requires a concerted
effort to creating a political economy approach or systemic paradigm.
Therefore, this paper argues that the next step in the evolution of IBF
should be social banking, in order to revive its initial purpose of social
justice, poverty alleviation and prevention of exploitation.
2. ISLAMIC ECONOMICS: UTOPIA
Islamic economics, in its modern usage, came into existence in the
early 1970s mainly as a critique of both the capitalist economic mode
of development and communist resource allocation system.  The
pioneering figures opined that the failure of economic development in
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Muslim society was capitalist economic development strategies that
ignored the importance of societal well being.  Consequently, their
objective was to develop an economic system that would develop a
human-centric development strategy.
While Kahf (2003) suggests that Islamic economics cannot be
considered outside the main discipline of economics, that perspective
ignores the primary aim of an Islamic economics paradigm with its
own values, rules and institutions with its politically orientated ‘systemic’
understanding.  The foundational axioms of the Islamic economic
paradigm, then, operationalize the aspirations of Islamic economists in
aiming at the creation of human-centric economics.  Ahmad (1980,
1994, 2003), Ariff (1989), Chapra (1992 and 2002), El-Ghazali (1994),
Naqvi (1981, 1994), Siddiqi (1981), and Sirageldin (2002) presented
works that used, in varying degrees, an axiomatic approach to justify
the existence of an Islamic political economy by treating Islamic ethos
as an ideal through which social and economic policies are assessed.
These axioms are as follows: Tawú¥d (unity), indicates the vertical
dimension of the Islamic ethical system; Al-‘adl wa’l-iúsŒn (justice
equilibrium) provides for the horizontal dimension of equity; IkhtiyŒr
(free-will), provides individual opportunities in the economic system to
choose between; Fard (responsibility) implies that individuals and society
need to uphold public good; Rububiyyah indicates divine arrangements
for nourishment, sustenance and directing things towards their
perfection; Tazkiyah calls for growth with purification that should
incorporate the good of  others and be conducted with ethical and
moral considerations; and Khilafah, which indicates an individual’s role
as God’s vicegerent on earth.  Lastly, the maqŒ§id al-shar¥cah
(objectives of the shar¥cah), which is used to interpret the text and
restore the principles of Islamic economics in relation to the objectives
of the shar¥cah is interpreted to suggest that Islamic economic principles
must lead to ‘human well-being.’
Together, these axioms define the foundational principles and
framework, in which economic and financial activity is intended to take
place, incorporating intra-and inter-generational social justice.  Moreover,
it reveals itself in the methodological framework of the Islamic economic
system.  In comparing the methodologies of Islamic economics and
conventional economics, the points of contrast are unambiguously
understood.  To highlight those points of contrast, first the methodological
framework of neo-classical economics is summarised as follows:
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(i) The point of departure is methodological individualism.
(ii) Behavioural postulate: self-interest oriented individuals
who (a) seek their own interests, (b) in a rational way, and
(c) try to maximise his/her own utility;
(iii) Market exchange.
Hence, a conventional economic system is based on a one dimensional
utility function, which leads to homoeconomicus or the economic
individual in a market system. The methodological postulates of Islamic
economics, on the other hand, can be summarised as follows (Asutay,
2007):
(i) Socio-tropic individual, not only individualism but social
concern is a prerequisite;
(ii) Behavioural postulates: socially concerned God-conscious
individuals who (a) in seeking their interests are similarly
concerned with the social good, (b) conducting economic activity
in a rational way in accordance with the Islamic constraints
regarding social environment and hereafter; and (c) in trying
to maximise his/her utility seeks to maximise social welfare as
well by taking into account the hereafter.
(iii) Market exchange is the main feature of economic operations
in the Islamic system; however, this system is filtered through
an Islamic process to produce a socially concerned and
environmentally friendly system.  In this process, socialist and
welfare state oriented frameworks are avoided to prevent
curbing of incentives in the economy.
Hence, in Islamic economics we have the two-dimensional utility
function (present and the hereafter), which leads to homoislamicus,
or as Arif (1989) names it, tab’ay (obedient) human-being, where “to
be a Muslim is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to be tab’ay”
(Arif, 1989).  Hence, as an implication, to be qualified as  tab’ay, one
needs to operationalise Islamic principles in every aspect of one’s life.
Therefore, Islamic economics aims at a world order where the
ontological and epistemological sources, the Qur’Œn and Had¥th,
determine the framework of the economic value system; it’s foundational
and operational dimensions and the behavioural norms of individual
Muslims. Islamic economics, thus, is an “approach to [and process of,]
interpreting and solving the man’s economic problems based on the
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values, norms, laws and institutions found in, and derived from all sources
of knowledge [in Islam]” (Haneef, 2005).  This, however, implies both
a systemic understanding and a political dimension.  Recalling that
modern Islamic economics emerged as part of the Islamic resurgence
in the 1970s, with political aspirations involving constructivist identity
politics, it is understandable that it was perceived to be a complementary
political component. However, as in Foucault’s philosophy, power is
central to define social and political meaning. Muslims, by not having
such global power, were unable to establish their political and economic
order.
This has consequences for IBF, which is an operational tool of
Islamic economics. To reiterate, Islamic finance is an institutional aspect
of Islamic economics which finances and regulates economic activity
in an Islamic framework.  Thus, there is a requirement for IBF
institutions to operate and utilise instruments, rules and regulations of
the shar¥cah.  IBF refers to these institutions that in the aspirational
sense, aims to establish and operationalise the Islamic economic system.
Since the systemic understanding of Islamic economics is not considered
by IBF (the reasons of which is discussed in a later section), IBF has
developed a working framework located in the neo-classical economic
paradigm.
3. FROM UTOPIA TO REALITY: ISLAMIC FINANCE AS A
HYBRID FINANCIAL SYSTEM
Responding to the failure of capitalist and socialist economic
development, the creation of IBF was inaugurated with the hope of
providing a financial base through which economic development could
be achieved. In its alternative system understanding, IBF was assigned
an important role: economic development with the objective of human
well-being and social justice.  The initial experience of Islamic banking
in Egypt in the late 1960s and early 1970s, for instance, had such
objectives, as they were socially oriented institutions.
IBF, however, has become internationalised with significant petro-
dollar assistance since the 1980s. In addition, the 1990s has witnessed
an unprecedented growth of IBF institutions and their assets base.
Yet, upon closer scrutiny of their financing, it is clear that the social
dimension is limited to zakŒh and other charitable activities, which,
nonetheless, ignores systematic economic development and social justice
action.  While the operations of IBF and the nature of Islamic modes of
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financing have expanded, the lives of common Muslim individuals have
not significantly benefited from it.
It can be seen that IBF institutions have opted for profitable Islamic
financing such as murŒbaúah instead of mushŒrakah and muèŒrabah.
This is important as it indicates the theoretical difference in orientation
of IBF.  More clearly, mushŒrakah and muèŒrabah is equity-finance
oriented, while murŒbaúah is debt-financing.  Taking into account that
Islamic economics aims for IBF to be preferably equity financing
towards value-added creating economic activity, the change towards
debt-financing is rather paradoxical.  To support this, Iqbal and Molyneux
(2005: 29) demonstrate, sampling from ten Islamic banks between 1994-
1996, that the percentage weight of mushŒrakah and muèŒrabah in
the total activities was only 7% each, with murŒbaúah claiming 70%
of the total financing.  Therefore, “most of the financing provided by
Islamic banks does not conform to the principle of profit-and-loss
sharing.  Instead, much of the financing provided by Islamic banks
takes the form of debt-like instruments” (Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000).
In addition, Hasan (2007), provides more recent data while studying
the Malaysian case, according to which the percentage share of
mushŒrakah declined from 1.4% in 2000 to 0.2% in 2006. Evidently,
he shows that the major modes of Islamic financing are in the form of
bayc bithaman Œjil and ijŒrah thumma al-bayc with 55.9% and 25.2%
respectively in 2006. In a more comprehensive manner, Nagaoke (2007)
provides a time-series comparison focusing on the mode of financing
for Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB) and Dubai Islamic Bank
(DIB).  According to his calculations, on the average, from 1984 to
2006, murŒbaúah constituted 88.1% of the mode of financing for the
former, and 67.3% for the latter.  For the same periods, muèŒrabah
and mushŒrakah claimed, on the average, about 1.7% for BIMB and
9.3% for DIB.  Hence, considering that in Islamic economics, equity or
profit sharing financing is considered superior to debt-like financial
instruments, having IBF institutions focusing more on debt-like financing
is an indication that IBF institutions have deviated from the aspirational
stand of Islamic economics.
In this context, it is important to reiterate that Islamic economics
aims at economic development in a larger sense, which can be
achievable only with long-term financing.  However, evidence provided
by Aggarwal and Yousef (2000), Iqbal and Molyneux (2005), Hasan
(2007) and Nagaoke (2007) show that “Islamic banks rarely offer long-
term financing to entrepreneurs seeking capital” (Aggarwal and Yousef,
IIUM Journal of Economics & Management 15, no. 2 (2007)174
2000). Moreover, developmental financing, with the objective of
economic growth, necessitates financing sectors such as agriculture,
industry, and manufacturing. However, “the majority of Islamic banks’
financial transactions, at least initially, were directed away from
agriculture and industry and toward retail or trade financing” (Aggarwal
and Yousef, 2000: 94).  That calculation is based on twenty-two Islamic
banks from various countries, which reveals that “on average, 56.7
percent of financing by nominal value were for maturities lasting less
than a year.  Medium-term (one to two years) and long-term (two to
five years) financing averaged 0.7 percent and 1.9 percent, respectively”
(Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000: 103). Such evidence can also be found in
Ahmed (2005), who, by using the case study of Sudan, suggests that
after the initial years, Islamic banks moved away from financing
agriculture and industry using profit-loss sharing schemes due to various
reasons including moral hazard or imperfect information.  Furthermore,
Warde (2000: 175) states that “not only were Islamic banks less likely
to invest in industry or agriculture, but they were more likely to invest
their money abroad and to keep it in a foreign country.”  As a result, the
value added of IBFs to the local economy further declines, and the
contribution of IBFs for economic growth of the real economy is rather
elusive.
Since debt-financing is short-term oriented while equity financing
is generally longer term and thereby, contributing more to economic
development, the avoidance of equity financing in contemporary Islamic
finance clearly indicates that IBF is not particularly interested in
economic development and social welfare. Similarly, such concerns
were raised by Choudhury (2001) who even criticises mushŒrakah
and muèŒrabah type of equity financing due to their failure in
internalising socio-economic justice and the value of work.  Consequently,
he is of the opinion that to “transform these financial instruments to
realise the ameliorative goals of shar¥cah, extensively cooperative
participation must be explicitly introduced. Such rules must reflect the
organisational and management processes involved in such extensively
co-operative and co-ordinated participatory enterprises” (Choudhury,
2001).  In addition, Warde (2000) is concerned with the utopia and
realities of Islamic economics and finance, and therefore states that
“the gap between promise [Islamic economics] and performance [Islamic
finance] was greatest in the area of economic development.  Despite
their support and special privileges … obtained by Islamic banks, they
behaved like risk-averse agents.  The early goal of concentrating on
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profit-and-loss sharing was soon abandoned.  The objective of
penetrating the hinterland and serving the rural areas was not fulfilled”
(Warde, 2000: 175).
In relation to social lending, the percentage of al-qarè al-hasan is
at a negligible level in the IBF sector (Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000).  In
addition, further involvement of the IBF sector in debt-like financing,
including tawarruq issues, clearly undermines the ‘productive economic
activity’ discourse in Islamic economics. The realities of financial
markets, which prioritise economic incentives rather than religious
behavioural norms, thus, has forced IBF to become part of the
international financial system by adopting the commercial banking model.
In that predicament, IBF is described as heterogeneous financial
products deprived of their value system that is imposed by utopian
Islamic economics.  In other words, since the 1990s, IBF represents
hybrid financial products in the international financial system and it is
accepted that this particular hybridisation requires religious not secular
construction.  Thus, the difference has been reduced to a technicality
in which the value system is referred to only in describing the Qur’Œnic
prohibition of ribŒ.
It is important to understand the reasons of this divergence between
IBF and Islamic economics.  As mentioned previously, Islamic
economics aims at creating a world order with political aspirations,
namely a system (Asutay, 2007).  In this identity politics, the Islamic
version of modern institutions and behavioural norms, such as the
homoIslamicus or taba’ay individual, are sought after.  However, this
is related to systemic aspirations and the value system expressed in
identity politics.  The realism of this constructivist ideology is tested by
recent developments in IBF that has renounced the value system, identity
politics and systemic understanding of Islamic economics.  Consequently,
IBF, by renouncing its own value-system, has become part of the
international financial system, which has been criticised by Islamic
economists for its materialism and failure in contributing meaningfully
to economic development.  In its essence, Islamic economics, with its
conceptualisation of homoIslamicus, proposes a normative world or
utopia, in which emphasis is on “what people should strive towards, as
opposed to how people are likely to behave (the ‘ought’ as opposed to
the ‘is’)” (Warde, 2000).  IBF, in its deviation from the norms and
axioms of Islamic economics, followed a realistic attitude based on
positivism rather than normative-ness.  In other words, Islamic
economics provides foundational axioms and principles but not
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operational axioms through which, Islamic financing could function in
an authentic manner.  This creates the “disparity between the functional
ends and the formalist means employed to reach them” (Hamaoudi,
2007).  It is also important to reiterate the role of political power and
the nature of world politics, which prohibited the development of an
Islamic economic system that would, similarly, provide IBF the
opportunity space it needs to follow a path of authenticity. As a result,
IBF institutions and their leading philosophies have relaxed the conditions
of the utopia assigned to it by Islamic economics.
It should also be noted that the microeconomics of financing is
indeed important in explaining the shunning of IBF from project financing
and mushŒrakah and muèŒrabah type of PLS financing.  In other
words, the usual microeconomic concerns such as risk, moral hazard,
and adverse selection etc. have been instrumental for IBF in their
misguided quest to adopt the commercial banking model with the primary
objective of profit maximisation and efficiency, as expected from any
neo-classical economics oriented institution.  The rise of this internal
discrepancy, discussed in a later section, constitutes the most crucial
failure of Islamic economics, namely the difficulty in changing the
economic behavioural norms of individuals despite the foundational
axioms derived from Qur’Œn and Sunnah.  This contradiction was
highlighted by Kuran as early as 1983.  In other words, conversion
from homoeconomics into homoIslamicus has not been successfully
achieved.
Reflecting on this theoretical divergence, it should be stated that it
is related to modern interpretations of Qur’Œnic verses and Islamic
injunctions.  More specifically, the current pragmatist position of IBF
opposes the foundational and aspirational position of Islamic economics.
Those foundational and aspirational premises rest on the belief that
“the revealed word of God in the Qur’an itself embodies rational
economic principles that are quite in line with the modern assumptions
of neoclassical economic theory.  As a form of universally applicable
theory about human beings’ economic behaviour, economic theory
necessarily is in accord with, and confirms the source of universal
knowledge, i.e. the Qur’an. Hence, homo Islamicus and homo
economicus are one and the same” (Maurer, 2005).  Also, Kahf’s
argument (2003) rejects a systemic understanding of Islamic economics
by establishing it on similar norms of human behaviour.  This provides
further evidence for the pragmatist positioning of IBF. With that
understanding, Islamic finance emphasises interpretations of shar¥cah,
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which focus on rationality and formal equality.  Hence, the ban on ribŒ
is perceived as a mechanism through which decisions are made within
a rational economic framework with the objective of rendering optimality
of the market mechanism (Maurer, 2005).  On the contrary, Islamic
economics’ reading of the same shar¥cah injunctions emphasize social
justice, need fulfilment and redistribution, namely a socio-political reading
within a political economy framework.  The position of Islamic
economics is, thus, the moralist modelling methodology (Tag El-Din,
2004).  Overall, Islamic economics suggests a new paradigm, while
IBF utilises the same Islamic foundation in placing itself in the existing
conventional paradigm, because “like any other financial system, Islamic
banking has to be viewed as evolving to meet modern requirements”
(Ahmad, 2005).
In sum, IBF is beginning to perpetuate a vicious circle due to the
Islamic banks’ lending criteria, contractual terms and costs of financing.
Particularly, financial exclusion from personal banking remains a
contentious issue. Paralleling personal banking, entrepreneurs excluded
from conventional banking are, also, excluded from the use of IBF.
Thus, the need of those entrepreneurs who cannot provide collateral is
not met in the IBF sector.  Clearly, the existence and prevalence of
such developmental issues negate the entire discourse of Islamic
economics and finance in relation to social justice or ma§laúah.
4.TESTING THE ASSIGNED VALUES OF ISLAMIC FINANCE
As opposed to the concerns of certain academics, practitioners suggest
IBF aims to uphold the following values among others (Khan, 2007):
(i) Community banking: Serving communities, not markets;
(ii) Responsible finance, as it builds systematic checks on financial
providers; and restrains consumer indebtedness; promotes ethical
investment and CSR Initiatives;
(iii) Alternative paradigm in terms of stability by linking financial
services to the productive, real economy; also it provides a moral
compass for capitalism;
(iv) Fulfils aspirations in the sense it widens the ownership base of
society, and offers ‘success with authenticity.’
While similar notions can be found in Iqbal and Molyneux (2005), it is
clear that these are the aspirations of Islamic economics as well. A
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critical examination of these objectives, however, indicates that IBF is
far from fulfilling these objectives due to the reasons explained so far.
Examination of the ‘assigned’ values provides further evidence.
Regarding the first objective of community banking, real life
experience shows that IBF has done little to contribute to capacity
building in the communities.  On the contrary, IBF has aimed at becoming
part of the international economic markets and, despite the imposed
social identity, “Islamic banks are quick to point out that they are not
charitable organizations, and that they must turn a profit” (Warde, 2000).
This is so, since, “in the harsh environment of the global economy,
[Islamic] banks must compete with conventional banks that usually
focus exclusively on profit maximisation.  [As] this allows them to
offer better remuneration to their depositors and to their shareholders”
(Warde, 2000: 154).  Clearly, having profit maximisation as the primary
aim negates the importance of societal responsibility and social identity.
Regarding responsible finance, there is no universally accepted
regulatory body that systematically checks Islamic financial providers.
The initiatives by AAOIFI in Bahrain and IFSB in Malaysia remain
weak and are not generally adopted.  To evidence this, Abdullatif (2007)
shows that a large number of Saudi Islamic finance practitioners, as
well as accountants and auditors, are largely unaware of AAOIFI
standards.
As part of restraining consumer indebtedness, the data presented
in the earlier section indicates that IBF institutions prefer involvement
in transactions that are debt-financing oriented, as they are more
profitable.  Thus, this obligation remains unfulfilled.
Concerning ethical investments, restraining the investment areas
of IBF does not necessarily make Islamic finance ethical.  Rather, it
only implies that IBF fulfils its legal expectations, as screening of Islamic
investment is part of shar¥cah.  This is, precisely, what makes IBF
active.  However, considering that ethicality includes being pro-active,
there is little indication that IBF is entirely ethical.  This, again, refers to
CSR initiatives, as recent studies on CSR of IBF demonstrate they
have not pro-actively developed such an understanding.  Their
perceptions of CSR remain within the framework of zakŒh distribution
and other non-systemic charitable activities (see Sarially, 2005 and 2007;
Dusuki, 2007).
With its alternative paradigm and conflicting theoretical
underpinnings, IBF is no longer part of the Islamic economic system
and, therefore, does not exhibit meaningful macroeconomic
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consequences.  Granted, it may link financial services to the economy’s
productive side, but this is not convincing when considering the preferred
financing is debt-financing as opposed to the original expectations that
it would be equity-financing.  Also, the most popular forms of financial
activity remain the murŒbaúah and lesser venture capital type of project
financing.  In that regard, it is difficult to argue IBF is related to the real
economy beyond financing the retail markets.  Furthermore, by becoming
part of the international financial system through hybridisation, it is
difficult to argue IBF plays the role of a moral compass for capitalism.
On the contrary, it seems that IBF has much to learn from conventional
finance in terms of ethical and CSR financing issues (Sarially, 2005 and
2007).
Pertaining to fulfilling aspirations, IBF has not positively affected
social capacity building and contributed to widening ownership.  Widening
ownership could have been possible through venture capital or profit-
loss sharing type of investments.  However, as discussed previously,
these do not seem to be preferred by IBF. It would seem that the
characteristics of IBF do not reflect the Qur’Œnic economic meaning
of authenticity or shar¥cah based principles as located in the aspirational
notions of Islamic economics.  Instead, “[i]n Islamic finance, religion
largely serves to obfuscate and complicate at some expense, while
simultaneously and disingenuously asserting highly exaggerated claims
of equity and social justice” (Hamaoudi, 2007).
5. SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTION AND ISLAMIC FINANCE:
RE-EXAMINING MASLĀHAH
It should be stated that social justice and economic development are
the fundamental and foremost objectives of IBF.  This is because the
main epistemological source of these social objectives are derived from
the maqŒ§id al-shar¥cah.  However, a close examination of the maqŒ§id
al-shar¥cah will show that it does not clearly indicate specifics
concerning the social dimension or socio-tropic individual.  The objective
of the shar¥cah (the Islamic way and code of conduct) according to al-
ImŒm al-GhazŒl¥ are as follows: “The obligation of the shar¥cah is to
provide the well-being of all human kind, which lies in safeguarding
their faith, their human self (nafs), their intellect (’aql), their progeny
(nasl) and their wealth (mŒl).”  This clearly demonstrates that these
are all individual oriented objectives and have no social connotations.
This implies that references to the maqasid-al shar¥cah and deducing
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from it the social dimensions of Islamic economics which are then
imposed on IBF, are not realistic.  In other words, IBF has been defined
by Islamic economics based on its own aspirational interpretation of
maqŒ§id al-shar¥cah.  Thus, the suggested value system that IBF needs
to uphold is not properly defined.  In this regard, it is also important to
examine the nature of the maqŒ§id because, as Siddiqi (2004) points
out, a systemic and dynamic understanding of:
“maqŒ§id al-shar¥cah could not be confined only to protection
(hifz), preserving what people had or saving them from harm, rather
they must include broader measures ensuring welfare [as] asserted
by Ibn  Qayyim … who emphasized justice and equity.  Furthermore,
he insisted that the means to justice and equity could never be
captured by a finite list.  Reason will guide us how to ensure justice
and equity in changing circumstances (Ibn  Qayyim, n.d.).”
It is crucially important, therefore, to distinguish:
 “between the objectives of Islam, as a way of life and the objectives
of Islamic Law [maqasid-al shar¥cah].  The former involves
aspects of personality and society the latter does not cover.  Also,
the former has a larger box of tools than available to the latter.
[Therefore,] [e]nvisioning the Islamic economy in the twenty-first
century is better done with reference to the goals of Islam as a
way of life rather than being done with reference to the goals of
Islamic Law.  This will enable us to handle issues like poverty and
inequality that a Law-based approach has failed to handle” (Siddiqi,
2004).
This point reinforces the earlier statement that Islamic economics has
imposed an incomplete frame of reference or an aspirational framework
on IBF.
Islamic economics, like neoclassical economics, suggests an implicit
social welfare function, and expects Islamic finance to work towards
that objective.  However, neo-classical economic theory’s implicit social
welfare function was undermined by the discourse and analysis
developed by the new political economy and public choice (see Mueller,
2003), which still follows the utility maximising individual.  The very
idea that there is a social welfare function, which is assumed to be
maximised by a benevolent authority is no longer a norm.  This is so,
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since, each government with their institutions are perceived to consist
of individuals who attempt to maximise their own individual utilities in
various capacities.  In other words, the organic state with the social
welfare function objective is no longer a reliable maxim.
Arguably, in the Islamic framework, the existence of the social
welfare function and its maximisation by various actors in the society
might be possible as religious norms essentialise the ‘socio-tropic’
individual.  This is particularly evident since Islam aims to create
homoislamicus or taba’ay individuals.  However, developments in the
evolution of IBF indicate, as contended by Kuran (1983), those norms
have not emerged despite the increasing awareness of Islam.
Interestingly, Siddiqi (2004) acknowledges that “even Islamic economists
failed to come up with historical evidence and current empirical data
on that kind of behaviour [that the acts of caring for others, serving
social interest while protecting one’s own, and avoiding doing any harm
to man, animal or the physical environment are not a rarity], with some
notable exceptions.” Therefore, unless dictatorial rule takes place, which
determines attitudes in the public sphere, the behavioural norms will
follow an adaptive rationality in perpetuating neo-classical norms and
will remain within the framework of neo-classical economics.  Since
dictatorial rule even failed to change the behavioural rules in Iran or in
Sudan, there is little indication this might occur through voluntary action.
Although voluntary action cannot be denied as an important source, it
still is not enough to maximise the social function since the free-rider
problem remains an issue.  The (neo-classical) adaptive nature of
behavioural norms would prevent social consensus as part of the ethico-
economic system proposed by Choudhury (1990) to work. As a result,
Choudhury (1985) assumes that “appropriate social policies
progressively transform individual consumption preferences to make
them conform with social preferences… The progressive conformity
between individual and social preferences establishes Social
Consensus.”  This indeed, refers to the aspirational nature of Islamic
economics (where ethical norms are part of the behavioural norms
through the endogenisation process) that fails to hold in the real world.
The social failure of IBF can also be explained by the pragmatist
and legalistic attitude of individuals, as Vogel and Hayes (1998) propose
when explaining prevalent attitudes towards IBF.  They also see that
the main strain in IBF is an attitude which can be described as “socially
and politically conservative, seeking individual piety and social mores
built around traditionalist compliance with fiqh, and looks to social and
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political improvements mainly as a result of that” (Vogel and Hayes,
1998: 27, footnote).  Thus, Islamic norms have not been instrumental in
shaping individual choices and preferences, which is further evidence
of the failure of homoislamicus.
Also, it is arguable whether Islamic economics even supports the
principle of the maximisation of the social welfare function.  This is so,
since, there is no clear reference for this in the Islamic political economy
framework.  The only indirect reference is through the maqŒ§id al-
shar¥cah which substantiates social justice, social welfare and the socio-
tropic individual.  However, as suggested by Siddiqi (2004), the maqŒ§id
al-shar¥cah does not contain such a social objective because it is only
related to the individual. This belief demonstrates a striking similarity
with Adam Smith’s contention that the market economy would better
serve social interest through the maximisation of individual interests.
However, developments in capitalism have shown that individualistic
attempts at maximising personal interest became the prevailing norm,
and therefore Smith’s predictions did not hold.  This is again related to
behavioural norms.
6. SECOND BEST SOLUTION: FAILURE OF THE ISLAMIC
ECONOMIC PARADIGM
The reality today indicates IBF does not represent the aspirations of
Islamic economic philosophy nor fulfils the expectations of many
Muslims in underdeveloped societies, for whom IBF was proposed as
a way out.  The current reality of IBF opposes the aspirations and
philosophical framework of Islamic economics.  The developments in
Islamic economics and IBF, thus, indicate that the theoretical position
of Islamic economics can be considered the ‘first best solution.’ It does
so by borrowing a conceptual understanding from neo-classical
economics. Moreover, in this ‘first best solution,’ like the conventional
economics’ aim of creating homoeconomics, Islamic economics aims
at creating homoislamicus by introducing and changing the behavioural
norms of individuals.  Therefore, its aspirational aims, supported by
behavioural and philosophical norms, should be considered as the first
best solution. Similar to conventional economics where the first best
solution failed to work, it is clear that the Islamic first best solution
cannot be attainable as well, as Kuran predicted in 1983.  Whether
Kuran’s argument is correct or ideologically acceptable to the founding
fathers of Islamic economics, experience now shows that Muslim
Second Best Solution in Overcoming the Social Failure of Islamic Banking 183
individuals and Islamic banks remain affiliated to utility and profit
maximisation. In addition, the available evidence clearly indicates that
IBF institutions aim at efficiency by ignoring and relegating the
importance of social efficiency.  Thus, in the contest between economic
and financial efficiency versus social efficiency as El-Gamal (2006)
states, the choice has been economic and financial efficiency.  This is
an indication of the overwhelming power of homoeconomicus
behavioural norms over homoislamicus.
As the first-best solution is not held in conventional economics,
neo-classical economics offers the second best solution, in which
homoeconomics still prevails but the failure of the market economy is
overcome by offering a rationale for the creation of institutions that
curb  capitalist excesses. Similarly, the same analogy can be offered to
the current state of IBF institutions and the consequences of their
working mechanism.  In other words, Islamic economics is currently
undergoing the same experience and the conceptual framework of
conventional economics can be used to explain this dilemma faced by
IBF.  This will correct the failure by bringing back the importance of
ethical issues and social justice into the IBFs objectives, and therefore
such conceptualisation should not be considered as defeatist but rather
a re-emergent position.
Since Islamic economics’ first-best solution of producing a financial
system based on authentic moral ethics has not taken root, in the next
stage of evolution the second-best solution must be accepted. The
second-best solution recognizes the current nature of IBF institutions.
Islamic economics behavioural norms and axioms in reality have been
relaxed by the practice of IBF.  This should be accepted as the norm
instead of having a desperate state of mind that ‘it went wrong.’  In this
second-best solution, IBF institutions are not expected to conduct social
justice oriented activities beyond what they are legally required.  Also,
they are not expected to fulfil the ethical norms and to move beyond
their legalistic requirements in relation to social issues.
However, the current important question is how social justice is to
be served?  What social-financial institutions can IBF offer to solve
economic development issues in the Muslim world?  While economic
justice and protection from exploitation may not have been properly
articulated by Islamic economics, it remains an important discourse in
Islam and the prophetic tradition.  Therefore, the search for fulfilling
the imperative for social justice should continue. The institutions of
Islamic economics, in order to overcome economic underdevelopment
IIUM Journal of Economics & Management 15, no. 2 (2007)184
issues, require considerable advancement and coherence.  These
institutions include zakŒh, waqf and takŒful.  However, these are part
of the legal responsibilities of IBF institutions.  In other words, as part
of the second-best solution, elimination of ribŒ would not result in a
social welfare maximising state, despite the supportive remarks made
in this direction by Tag El-din (2000).  ZakŒh, on the other hand, has
not been systematically organised to serve the development needs of
the society in a systematic manner.  TakŒful, again, is not a development
oriented financial contract, while the creation of waqf is left to
philanthropists.
It is important to note that at this stage of development, this paper
does not suggest IBF should be restructured to incorporate the authentic
Islamic axioms including social justice.  On the contrary, they should be
accepted as the second-best solution, due to the inability to establish
the framework provided by the Islamic economic system.  IBF,
therefore, should remain to respond to the market as it is, as “the current
Islamic experience, notwithstanding its limitations, has proved to offer
an invaluable service for both consumer and producer needs and it
may well remain for this particular purpose” (Tag El-Din, 2004).
However, social justice and developmental aims, including long-term
financing and venture capital, can be structured in “a more specialized
Islamic institutional set up … in line with the recent global developments
where a broad variety of institutional structures” exist as examples
(Tag El-Din, 2004).  This will provide for institutional corrective
mechanisms that will ensure the second best solution yields the expected
social outcome alongside commercial banking.
7. OVERCOMING THE FAILURE: (ISLAMIC) SOCIAL
BANKING AS A WAY FORWARD
Clearly, as the discussion so far demonstrates, IBF has failed to
internalise the social dimension and social justice into its own operational
function.  As a consequence, the second-best solution requires new
models of development.  In this new modelling or re-orienting “the
brand name of Islamic finance [should] emphasize issues of community
banking, microfinance, socially responsible investment, and the like”
(El-Gamal, 2006).  The difficult state of economic affairs in the
developing world requires direct attention, which IBF, will not deal with.
Therefore, paralleling the neo-classical framework, there is a need to
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develop a welfare economics oriented paradigm, in which social justice
and ethical norms can be exercised.
The need to moderate the consequences of the failure of IBF by
utilising the second best solution, hence, is important.  This moderation
can be done by introducing ethics and social justice directly to the working
of IBF institutions.  In other words, in this moderating function, new
institutions should be created as a new project for ethical Islamic finance
beyond IBF, as the latter remains loyal to legalistic Islamic dimensions
not Islamic ethics.  In this effort, the evolutionary financial experience
in the West can be taken as an example.  Minsky et al. (1996), for
instance, rationalise the existence of Community Development Banks
(CBDs) by pointing to market failure, when they state that “when market
forces fail to provide a service that is needed and potentially profitable,
then it is an appropriate role for government to help create the market.”
The creation of ethical IBF and investment institutions, in the form
of Islamic social banking, as part of civil society should be the next
stage of financial development in the moral economy of the Muslim
world.  This too, should be aimed at social capacity building and individual
functioning to create the right environment for economic development
in a broad sense, as defined by Sen (1999). Granted, this is not entirely
novel as the initial experience in Egypt mentioned earlier, was a social
bank. Adding to the 1963 experience of Mit Ghamr Bank, “Nasser
Social Bank (NSB) and the Faisal Islamic Bank (FIB) [in Egypt aimed,]
as part of their missions [to alter] Egypt’s social structure by providing
credit to poor Egyptians who would not otherwise be able to obtain
credit” (Mayer, 1985).  The philosophy that lay behind the Mit Ghamr
Bank “was that Islamic banks should provide small loans to the poorest
of potential borrowers not served by existing institutions, these being
small peasants, small artisans, and urban workers” (Najjar, 1979 cited
in Mayer, 1985: 38).
In this new stage, thus, equity-based finance, with direct involvement
of civil society, as in the first example of Mit Ghamr, should be the
solution.  Boudjellal (2006: 31) is also of the opinion that, in addition to
commercial Islamic banks, PLS (profit and loss sharing) type of banks
in the form of “non-monetary financial intermediaries” can be
institutionalised, which “use profit and loss sharing modes by holding
equity stakes in selected business companies.” Such an institutional
solution aiming at correcting and moderating the failure of IBF will
contribute to the development of individual lives by focusing on societies’
micro-dynamics rather than affecting the financial equilibrium. This
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fits into the new development paradigm, which has shifted focus from
macro-economic development to micro dynamics.  Thus, the
involvement of IBF will lead to the maximisation of welfare in society
by extending financial involvement to embrace the larger society in this
economic dynamic.
Social banks, in its modern form, are practised in many European
countries in order to provide ethical financing and, simultaneously, work
towards micro development purposes.  This is because it is a way
forward to overcome banking exclusion and, also, aims to expand the
ownership base of the society.  Minsky et al. (1996) state that one aim
of the CDBs, “should be to seek out projects which promise to be
profitable but which will not be financed because of the small size of
the project” and also provide financing in various dimensions for those
who are excluded from the financial system.
Social banking is defined as “a socially responsible form of banking,
in which suppliers of financial services have a vested interest in the
social outcome and effects of the distribution of their products” (Reifner,
2001).  Also, social banks internalise the moral dimensions of the market
system “to introduce ‘need orientation’ (Sen) into the exchange of
commodities and services to further general welfare” (Reifner, 2001)
of the society.
The European experience indicates mainstream private banks, state-
owned banks and specialist lenders offer social lending and serve social
objectives (Mayo and Guene, 2001).   Therefore, social banking has a
private banking nature as it works ‘in a competitive environment,
necessitating profit orientation and cost cutting as major goals of its
economic activity.  On the other hand it implies a reference to social
standards” (Reifner, 2001).  Thus, in addition to micro financing, social
banks involve many social development projects as depicted in Table 1.
The examination of markets and needs in Table 1 show great
similarity between aspirational IBF and social banking.  Therefore,
adopting social banking to IBF should not be a difficult exercise in
terms of objectives.  On the contrary, it will enable us to overcome
some of the difficulties and tension areas between Islamic economics
and the current state of IBF.  Examining the nature of social banks
further substantiates the claim that social banking can be considered as
the new phase of IBF with ma§laúah objectives.  Social banks, as
post-war European experience demonstrates, does not only include
“traditional core bodies of the social economy, mutuals, co-operatives
and associations, but also new organisational models which fit neither
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the classical public or private sector forms” (Mayo and Guene, 2001),
as they:
(i) try to find solutions rather than to place themselves in a new
market sector;
(ii) often refer to factors as social solidarity, democratic organisations
or the primacy of the individual over capital;
(iii) are often the result of public/private partnership and have a close
relationship with their local communities;
(iv) do not have the market as their sole source of income, instead,
securing public subsidies, donations or loans – they often have
very mixed income;
(v) often give specific attention to disadvantaged people;
(vi) have small scale structures with larger numbers of non-active
associates of unpaid volunteers.
In highlighting the importance of social banks, the European Commission
identifies its necessity by stating: “The social economy and the activities
oriented to meet the need unsatisfied by the market can lead to the
development of a new sense of entrepreneurship particularly valuable
for economic and social development at local level.  This sense of
entrepreneurship is closer to the aspirations and values of people that
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do not seek profit making but rather the development of socially useful
activities or jobs.  These forms of entrepreneurship have a useful role
in promoting social cohesion and economic local performance” (cited
in Mayo and Guene, 2001).
Social banking should not only be considered as development
oriented banking.  On the contrary, as the European examples show,
they provide personal financial services including bank accounts,
mortgages and small business lending activities.  In other words, the
social nature of these banks does not imply that they are not financial
institutions.  Rather, they are banks aiming to achieve financial efficiency
and use this to promote social efficiency.  As Mayo and Guene (2001)
state “the social dimension allows the financing institutions to innovate
around method [social objective] to reduce risk and improve returns.”
Without this, social banks would repeat the experience of IBF by
duplicating or mimicking mainstream banking by supporting bankable
projects only.  “Instead, social banking methods widen the frame of
those able to access finance” (Mayo and Guene, 2001) and thereby
contributes to the cohesion of social and economic objectives.
Reifner (2001) suggests that the introduction of social standards
into the objectives function of banks is by the following:
(i) internal moral standards of social responsibility from the corporate
identity and market image of the bank, or:
(ii) through legal obligations for community reinvestment and equal
treatment of citizens, or:
(iii) merely by the pressure of institutional investors and other
customers who are willing to act as agents of public goals.
In checking the extent to which social banks complement IBF, it is
clear that ma§laúah provides the moral standard for social good, and
shar¥cah requires justice and benevolence. Therefore, banks are
encouraged to develop a consciousness concerning the consequences
of their business beyond narrow shar¥cah compliancy into pro-active
thinking. This should be satisfactory enough for IBF institutions to
practise social banking.  IBF, being specialised banks, have the
experience and the knowledge of developing “new products and
procedures for the distribution and administration of financial services
which promise better social effects for users and society, without creating
losses and disadvantages for the general business of its provider”
(Reifner, 2001). Therefore, after thirty years experience of IBF industry,
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Ahmed (2004) also is of the opinion that the “social aspect of Islamic
banks can be best realized by financing the poor micro-entrepreneur”
in the contemporary world.
In reorienting towards social banking, “the Islamic in Islamic finance
should relate to the social and economic ends of financial transactions,
rather than the contract mechanics through which financial ends are
achieved” (El-Gamal, 2006). Thus, as Siddiqi (2004) argues, a move
towards goals and policy rather than the mechanistic and legal structure
of IBF will serve human well-being much better.
8. CONCLUSION
Islamic economics relies on behavioural norms to encourage the growth
of a social welfare maximising state shaped by its foundational axioms.
However, thus far, those aspirational expectations have not materialised
in the operational side of Islamic economics, namely IBF.  In opposing
the views of Islamic economists, Kuran (1983 and 1995) argues that
religious norms are not enough to change people’s economic behaviour
(in creating homoislamicus) when they face the problem of maximising
their utility and welfare.  Therefore, he finds that the main shortcoming
in IBF, and hence the source of its failure, is economic incentives.
Empirical evidence discussed earlier suggests that Kuran’s prediction
was right, as economic incentives not religious norms determine the
structure of Islamic financing in the current economic order.  This is
evidenced with the lesser financing extended to mushŒrakah and
mudarabah. Importantly, the failure of holding the norms of Islamic
economics on an individual level, not only institutionally, remains as an
enduring quagmire that Muslims must recognize and re-evaluate in
regards to the direction of societal development.
The aim of Islamic economics is novel by making reference to
social justice and well-being.  It is a fact that under no circumstances
can economic incentives fulfil such objectives in Islamic or conventional
economics.  Therefore, correcting the failure of IBF, which has deviated
from the aims of Islamic economics, should be in the form of introducing
robust social justice oriented principles, or by institutionalising and
endogenising social justice into its operational nature as social banks.
This will help to establish optimality between “venal behaviour for one
that is profitable but unethical, and … sacrificial behaviour for one that
is ethical but not profitable… [and the] choice [is indeed] relative to the
values of the actors and the interest at stake” (Le Menestrel, 2002).
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There is, therefore, a need to go beyond the legal interpretations
and literal reading of the text. A value and objective oriented approach
would help overcome the growing tension between IBF’s performance
and Islamic economics’ utopia.  This is possible by recognising and
diagnosing the problem that the first-best solution, based on the axioms
and foundational principles of Islamic economics, has failed and IBF
has come out as the second-best solution.  By using the analogy of the
neo-classical theory, IBF has to move into the third stage of institutional
development by introducing social banking into the market to correct
its social failure.  With the existence of such banking institutions, it
will be possible to respond to the growing economic development need
of society by increasing the social capacity of individuals and make
them ‘functioning,’ as Sen (1999) defines them and as Islamic economics
aims for.
This is the objective of the Islamic economic system: to create
equilibrium between scarce resources and unlimited needs through a
moral filter system that produces a socially and financially optimal
economic state.  Also, in that economic state, human well-being is served
through inclusive policies and economic value creation oriented
economic activity (Chapra, 2000).  In other words, goals and objectives
should have primacy over rules and regulations so that the correct
institutions and financial products can be created for need fulfilment
(Siddiqi, 2004). Islamic social banking, thus, can provide the “new identity
based on substantive and ethical religious tenets” (El-Gamal, 2006: 191)
on the growth of IBF institutions for a better future, a future in which
opportunity spaces can be created for achieving prosperity in this world
and in hereafter, (falŒú), through purification and perfection of individuals
and institutions for growth and development, as tazkiyah suggests.
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